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The literature on women’s descriptive representation has looked at the debate on open and
closed lists as a choice between electoral systems. This article instead focuses on whether
voters or the parties are biased against female candidates. Using data from six Estonian
elections, the article ﬁnds that voters are not consistently biased against female candidates
and open lists do not necessarily decrease women’s representation. However, unknown and
non-incumbent female candidates fare signiﬁcantly worse than similar men. The analysis
also shows that parties do not place women in electable positions on closed lists, and closed
lists do not improve women’s representation.
Keywords: candidate gender; voter preference; political parties; candidate selection; electoral
systems; Estonia
1. Introduction
In most countries, women are far less likely to hold elected ofﬁce than men, and there has been
virtually no change in the gender composition of parliaments in some countries since the 1970s.
This is the case despite advances made in women’s education, employment rates, and substantial
changes in public attitudes about female leadership. What or who is still standing in the way of
electing women to ofﬁce? This article looks at the debate on the effect of closed and open lists on
women’s representation, an issue that ultimately comes down to the question of whether political
parties or voters disadvantage female candidates. While previous research in this area has tested
theories about list types at the country level, this article reassesses the accuracy of this theory at
the individual level, that is, at the level of the actual causal mechanism.
I use data from six parliamentary elections in Estonia between 1992 and 2011. The Estonian
case is insightful for many reasons. First, during the 20-year span, the electoral system has largely
remained unchanged and simultaneously combines both closed and open lists. The uniqueness of
the system allows us to test the effect of list types on women’s election while holding everything
pertaining to each election constant. Second, the availability of detailed party and candidate data
permits the testing of the theories at the level of the mechanism rather than observing a relation-
ship at the country level. Third, previous research on individual-level data has focused on candi-
date-centred systems – mainly single member districts (SMD), but also single transferable vote
(STV) – and analysed only a single point in time. The Estonian data provide the opportunity
to test the effect of gender on votes, election chances and list position in a party-centred pro-
portional system over a 20-year period.
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Using these data, the article ﬁrst analyses the effect of gender on votes and ﬁnds that women
are associated with fewer votes at some elections, but not at others. A closer examination reveals
that the gender gap in votes is driven by a large group of weak non-incumbent candidates who do
not stand a chance for ofﬁce. Among competitive candidates, that is, those with a realistic chance
of winning a seat, women do not receive fewer votes than men. Second, the article tests the effect
of gender on getting elected from open lists, and ﬁnds little evidence that women are associated
with lower election probability from open lists. These two results together suggest that there is no
consistent voter bias against female candidates in Estonia and, thus, open lists do not harm
women’s election to parliament. Lastly, the article turns to potential party biases and looks at
the effect of gender on placement on closed party lists. Interestingly, women are often associated
with lower places on closed lists, suggesting that parties do not support female candidates.
Thus, unlike much of the previous macro-level research, this article ﬁnds that closed lists
are not necessarily beneﬁcial for women’s elections, and open lists are not necessarily
unfavourable.
2. Closed vs. open lists and women
The explanations of women’s underrepresentation in politics are varied, ranging from institutional
factors to socioeconomic conditions and public attitudes. Of all these, institutional obstacles and
particularly electoral systems have probably received the most attention. For decades, researchers
have observed a positive association between proportional representation (PR) systems with high
district magnitudes and women’s percent among representatives (Duverger 1955; Rule 1987,
1994; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Matland 1998; McAllister and Studlar 2002; Salmond
2006). High district magnitudes are likely to increase the number of seats a party receives in a
district and advance women’s representation, because the second and third positions in party
lists are often also captured by women. Thus, the more seats a party wins in a district (i.e. the
higher the party magnitude), the more likely will there be women among the delegates
(Matland 1993).
Others have argued that PR systems increase women’s representation because they are less
candidate centred, emphasising party representation and reducing personal vote incentives
(Rule 1987; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Thames and Williams 2010). Until recent decades,
most PR systems made voters choose between parties rather than candidates. For this reason,
the closed list PR systems are called party centred – the focus of the electoral contest is the differ-
ences between parties and not candidates’ personal traits. In contrast, SMD, STV, single non-
transferable vote and also open-list PR systems are candidate centred – voters have to choose
between candidates. Some cross-national studies have found that countries using closed lists
elect more females than those with open lists (Rule 1987; Kenworthy and Malami 1999;
Thames and Williams 2010). Systems where candidates are highly visible can reduce women’s
representation compared to the party-centred systems because parties may be reluctant to nomi-
nate women as such nominations can reduce the party’s electoral success (Thames and Williams
2010). If female candidates receive fewer votes at the polls, then including them will reduce the
parties’ chances of election.
The empirical evidence on the beneﬁts of closed lists is, however, not wholly conclusive.
While Valdini (2012) ﬁnds that women are less likely to be nominated in open-list systems,
she adds that this is only the case in more traditional societies, and whether the list is open or
closed has no effect in more egalitarian societies like Finland. A number of other researchers
have found no difference in women’s representation between countries with closed and open
lists (Schmidt 2009; Schwindt-Bayer 2009), and scholars have started to question the theory
(Matland 2005).
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The typical way of looking at this debate on list types is to see it as one between electoral
systems – which institutional settings are related to higher female representation. But we can
also interpret this discussion as one about who the assumed culprit is, that is, whether it is the
biased voters who do not want to vote for women, or the parties with male-dominated hierarchies.
Closed lists should be superior to open lists only if parties support women’s candidacy and voters
do not. The causal mechanism linking closed lists to higher women’s representation rests on party
and voter behaviour, and as such we should look for evidence at the individual, rather than cross-
national, level. The most substantial proof would be to detect voters to be less likely to give their
support to women, and, ﬁnd parties to support women’s election by placing them at the top of
closed lists.
Individual-level research on the effects of gender on votes and getting elected is still
less common, but has become more widespread in the last 10–15 years. Most work has
focused on candidate-centred systems such as SMD or STV. If these candidate-centred
systems indeed reduced women’s representation through voter behaviour, gender should
have a signiﬁcant effect on candidates’ votes and election probability. Some individual-
level research on STV systems does indeed suggest a voter bias against women (Ortega
Villodres 2008; Schwindt-Bayer, Malecki, and Crisp 2010), but the effects are small and con-
ditional on other factors (e.g. party size). Research on SMD in Canada shows that women
who contest open seats cost the party more in popular vote loss than men at similar races,
but the gender vote gap is marginal when an incumbent is running for re-election (Young
2006).
While the above works give some indication of voter biases, many other scholars have
found no relationship among candidates’ gender, election probability, and votes (Norris and
Lovenduski 1995; Black and Erickson 2003; Kunovich 2012). Even in Ireland, where
women’s representation has remained at one of the lowest levels among democracies, research-
ers have found no evidence that women receive fewer ﬁrst preference votes (McElroy and
Marsh 2010, 2011). The work on Ireland also suggests that, despite the lack of clear voter
bias, a third of female and 17% male candidates still believe that voters prefer male candidates.
In addition, a majority of female candidates say that women are not given enough opportu-
nities by parties, suggesting rather a party bias at the nomination phase (McElroy and
Marsh 2011).
A good way to gauge party support for female candidates is to look at the placement of can-
didates on election lists. Previous work has distinguished three main types of list positions –
mandate, ﬁghting, and ornamental (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985). If women were placed
in the mandate positions, that is, those from which the chances of being elected are good,
party support for women would be strong. Candidates in ﬁghting positions may or may not be
elected depending on how well the party does. Women placed in those positions have some
party support. If, however, parties were more likely to place women into positions where the pro-
spect of election is minimal, that is, ornamental positions, parties could be considered biased
against female candidates. Recent studies have found the latter to be the case, showing that it
is parties rather than voters who do not support women (Kunovich 2003; Esteve-Volart and
Bagues 2012). In particular, Tavits (2010) ﬁnds that in Estonia women are ranked almost four
places lower on closed lists than men.
Party elites may also have a more subtle effect on women’s election. Fox and Lawless (2010)
show that women receive less encouragement from party elites to seek ofﬁce, and are also less
likely to be approached and recruited by political actors. This affects the political ambitions of
potential candidates and, as a result, women are less likely to even consider running for ofﬁce
(Fox and Lawless 2004, 2010).
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The notion that closed lists improve women’s representation also assumes that all parties
support women’s representation to the same extent. This contradicts party-level research that
has found left-wing parties to be associated with higher levels of women among party MPs
(Caul 1999; Holmsten, Moser, and Slosar 2010). Left parties also have more women among
the higher ranks of the party, which in turn can affect the percent of female candidates a party
nominates and sends to the elected ofﬁce (Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Kittilson 2006, 124;
Cheng and Tavits 2011). Thus, closed lists would beneﬁt women if the party system was domi-
nated by (left-wing) parties who were more supportive of female candidates.
A more recent study has argued that the effect of preferential voting on representation varies
across countries and years depending on the interaction between parties’ and voters’ concerns
regarding women’s representation (Matland and Lilliefeldt 2014). When parties and voters are
in harmony and believe that women’s representation is important, electoral rules have very
little impact. But when parties and voters do not agree on the role of women in politics, electoral
rules can either increase or decrease representation based on the precise nature of the interaction
between parties’ and voters’ attitudes towards women’s representation.
The juxtaposition of work on women’s representation conducted at different levels of analysis
brings to light some interesting contradictions. While the macro-level research suggests that
closed lists should beneﬁt women because then voters cannot reduce women’s chances of elec-
tion, individual-level research ﬁnds little evidence that voters care about the candidate’s gender
at all. On the contrary, it appears that parties may even be more biased than the voters,
meaning that closed lists may even harm, rather than improve, women’s representation.
Because individual-level research gets to the heart of the theory better than cross-national
work, this article will study the effects of list types on representation at the individual level.
The uniqueness of the Estonian electoral system also allows us to test the effects of closed and
open lists on women’s representation simultaneously, something that the previous work has
been unable to do.
This article will investigate whether parties or voters are more likely to stand in the way of
women’s election to the parliament. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the electoral
system and women’s representation in Estonia. Sections 4 and 5 explore the potential voter
bias by looking into the effect of gender on votes and election probability from open lists.
Section 6 investigates party bias and analyses the effect of gender on placement on closed national
lists.
3. Women and elections in Estonia
The 101 members of the Estonian parliament are elected through a proportional two-tier system
that combines closed and open lists. The system has largely remained unchanged over the six
elections. The country is divided into 12 districts (11 in 1995 and 1999) along administrative
borders. The number of mandates available in a district is proportional to the district’s population
size, such that larger districts receive more seats. The average district magnitude is eight, while the
smallest district has ﬁve and the largest has 14 seats. Parties present separate candidate lists for
each district (open lists) and one single national list containing all candidates (closed). All candi-
dates nominated by parties are included in 1 of the 12 district lists and also in the national list.
Neither of the two lists is alphabetical and candidates are ordered in accordance with the prefer-
ences of the parties and their leadership. No legislative quotas apply to either list.
Each voter has one vote that they cast for a candidate on the district list. Within each district
and party, the candidates will be reordered based on the number of votes they receive. A candidate
receiving votes higher or equal to the quota of his or her district is elected by the personal
mandate.1 Votes for the candidates of each party are then pooled at the district level and
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parties receive a number of mandates equal to the number of times the party meets the Hare quota.
As of 2003, a party is given an additional mandate if the remainder of votes is at least 75% of the
quota. The district mandate will then be given to candidates who rank highest in their party after
the votes are tallied. If a party received two mandates in a district, the two candidates receiving the
most votes in that party will be elected to the parliament from that district.
Other than the 75% of quota rule, the remainders do not count towards receiving a district
mandate in Estonia. This usually leaves some of the district mandates undistributed. These undis-
tributed mandates are pooled nationally, determining the total number of compensatory mandates.
Compensatory mandates are distributed between parties in a manner that is proportional to the
remainders of each party – parties with larger reminders receive more compensatory mandates.
The candidates that receive the compensatory mandates are determined by their place in the
closed national lists. The mandate is given to candidates further up in the national list even if
they received fewer votes in the district than someone further down the national list. If a
candidate has already received a personal or a district mandate they are skipped on the
national list.
The number of candidates elected under each type of list is not predetermined. Rather, this
depends on the number and strength of parties in districts. If there are many competitive
parties, votes will be split between them, lowering the chances of each individual party receiving
a district mandate and leaving more seats to be distributed by the compensatory mandate. This
was the case in the ﬁrst elections when most seats were determined by the closed lists. In the
2000s, the number of competitive parties decreased and more mandates were distributed at the
district level using the open lists. Table 1 shows the number of candidates elected under each
list type. While more and more candidates have been elected under open lists, this does not
mean that the trend will continue. As the Estonian party system keeps changing, the number of
representatives elected under either list type will, inevitably, also change. It is difﬁcult to
predict the number of representatives elected under each type of list at the party and at the national
level.
The electoral system Estonia uses is quite unique in the way it combines open and closed lists.
It makes voters choose between candidates, but also allows parties to support certain candidates
by placing them at the top of national lists.2 This provides for an interesting case study where we
can look at both voter and party biases during the same election.
Table 1 shows the number and percent of female candidates and elected representatives over
the six elections. The ﬁrst democratic elections were associated with poor political representation
of women, something that has been common to all post-communist countries (Matland and Mon-
tgomery 2003). While women were involved in the process of democratisation in Eastern Europe,
they did not do so as women or feminists. Initially, many women actually expressed the desire not
to participate in the workforce or in politics. Issues of gender equality were associated with the
discredited communist regime, and the initial rejection of feminism and egalitarian goals was,
to a large extent, a rejection of communism (Jaquette and Wolchik 1998).
Survey results conﬁrm the explicit rejection of women’s participation in politics. In the mid-
1990s, nearly 80% of men and about 60% of women in Estonia believed that “men make better
political leaders” (Wilcox, Stark, and Thomas 2003, 45). But attitudes changed quite rapidly in the
following years. A survey asking a similar question in 2005 found the respective percentages to be
53 and 34 (Dreman et al. 2006, 19), showing a marked decrease in just 10 years. Similarly, in
2005, only 19% of men and 40% of women believed that there should be more women represen-
tatives in the Estonian parliament, and these percentages were 32 and 49 just four years later
(Vainu, Järviste, and Biin 2010, 137). Today, the majority of Estonians are willing to vote for
female candidates.3
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Table 1. Female candidates and representatives by list type and overall retention rates, 1992–2011.
1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
T F F% T F F% T F F% T F F% T F F% T F F%
Elected 101 13 12.9 101 12 11.9 101 18 17.8 101 19 18.9 101 24 23.8 101 20 19.8
Open 41 3 7.3 49 3 6.1 55 9 16.4 74 11 14.9 75 17 22.7 82 18 22
Closed 60 10 16.7 52 9 17.3 46 9 19.6 27 8 29.6 26 7 26.9 19 2 10.5
Candidates 629 88 14.0 1256 218 17.7 1884 508 27.0 963 206 21.4 975 264 27.1 789 178 22.6
Retention 51 50.5 53 52.5 39 38.6 68 67.3 67 66.3
Notes: T, total number of candidates, F, female candidates, F%, percent female. Data on retention rates from Mõttus and Sikk (2011).
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The dynamics in public attitudes are consistent with women’s electoral success in the open
lists. At the ﬁrst two elections, under 10% of those elected through open lists were women;
this increased to 15–16% during the turn of the century, and 22% of representatives from open
lists were women in the last two elections. Because of the low percentages of women elected
through the open lists and the (initially) negative attitudes about women’s participation in politics,
the blame for the underrepresentation of women is often put on the voters. It is argued that includ-
ing more women among candidates does not make for a good campaign strategy for the parties, as
voters would not want to vote for them (Raitviir 2000, 2002).
Other researchers have also investigated the role of parties in the representation of women in
Estonian politics. The results are not at all ﬂattering for the parties – their executives are not inter-
ested in supporting the representation of women (Biin 2004), and some female politicians have
voiced concerns of discrimination by male party elites (Laur 2003). Table 1 shows that the pro-
portion of women elected to parliament through closed lists is generally higher compared to the
open lists, but there is considerable variation. It is difﬁcult to make conclusions from this about
the good intentions of the parties and the positive effect of closed lists, particularly because the
results of the national tier are dependent on the district results. What is not dependent on the dis-
trict results is the order in which candidates are placed on the national lists. Thus, a more accurate
test of the parties’ potential biases is not the outcome of the national tier, but their initial inten-
tions, that is, the order in which parties have placed the candidates on the closed list.
To analyse the potential voter and party biases in more detail, the article will next look at the
effects of gender on votes, election chances from the open lists and on placement in the closed
national lists. Together, these individual-level analyses will test the causal mechanism between
lists types and women’s representation more accurately than macro-level research could. If
open lists have a negative effect on women’s representation due to voter bias, we would ﬁnd
female candidates to be associated with fewer votes and lower election probability from the dis-
trict open lists. We might also expect a stronger effect of gender on votes and election probability
at the earlier elections, during which public attitudes towards female leadership were more
negative.
To study the biases of parties, I test whether women are placed at electable positions on the
closed national lists. It should be reiterated that while the closed lists are publicly available before
the elections, they are not presented to the voters at the polling booths. This may mean that parties
feel less pressure for gender balance on the closed lists as they might in countries where closed
lists are the only basis for election. On the one hand, this might make the Estonian ﬁndings less
applicable to other countries, but on the other hand, this also means that the closed lists in Estonia
represent parties’ true preferences even more. Finally, it should be noted that while the two lists
are (to an extent) interdependent, the best strategy for any party to get a particular candidate
elected is to place them as far up as possible on both lists. In terms of getting elected, there is
nothing to be gained from placing a candidate in the middle or further down the closed list.
4. Gender and votes
If open lists disadvantage women, we should expect female candidates to receive fewer votes.
Table 2 shows the median votes for the six elections. The median vote for women is lower
than men’s in ﬁve of the six elections, but the difference is exceptionally large in 1995, 1999,
and 2007. At those three elections, the median for women was as low as 50–60% of men’s. In
2003 and 2011, women performed about as well as men in terms of the median votes, and the
median for women was even higher than for men in 1992.
This initial look at the data suggests that, rather than consistently performing worse, women
do particularly poorly in some elections and not in others. There are two main reasons for the poor
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performance of female candidates in 1995, 1999, and 2007. First, these three elections saw
increases in the number of female candidates (Table 1). With this general increase in female can-
didates, there was also an increase in weak female candidates, that is, those who received very few
votes. Second, the gender vote gap is particularly high among the non-incumbent candidates and
lower among incumbents.4 Table 2 shows that incumbent female candidates do just as well or
even better than men – the women’s vote as a percent of men’s is close to 100 or even higher.
But when a candidate has not held ofﬁce at the national level before, gender differences
emerge. The gap among the non-incumbents is especially large in 1995, 1999, and 2007 and
we also see the increase in female candidates and the overall gender vote gap in these years. In
conclusion, it appears that gender differences in votes are driven by a surge in female candidates,
many of whom performed poorly at the polls.
So what caused this surge among weak performers? Before 2003 candidate lists were not
capped, and parties had the opportunity to ﬁle as many candidates as they wanted. This resulted
in the parties ﬁling as many as 300 candidates each, triple the amount of representatives in the
parliament. The strategy was to increase the votes for the party by having more vote-seeking can-
didates on the lists. The surge in female candidates in 1995 and 1999 was part of this strategy and
not really a move to improve women’s political representation. The percent of female candidates
dropped in 2003 as the lists were capped. The next increase in the number of female candidates in
2007 was more likely due to changing attitudes among the public and (some of) the parties about
women’s role in politics. It is likely that many women themselves became more interested in
running for ofﬁce, but were possibly seen by the voters as lacking political experience.
Because other personal and/or party characteristics such as age or popularity of the party also
inﬂuence voters, the above evidence on its own is not sufﬁcient to determine the effect of gender
on votes. The analysis to follow will control for candidate’s placement in district and national
lists, incumbency, age, and popularity of the party. Table 3 shows the ordinary least squares
(OLS) regressions explaining votes for the six elections. The dependent variable in these
models is the logit transformation of the candidate’s share of district votes. Without the transform-
ation the vote shares are an inappropriate dependent variable, because the values are bound
between 0 and 1, and also because most observations are clustered close to zero.5 After the trans-
formation, the dependent variable y becomes
y = log yi/Vd
1− yi/Vd
( )
,
where yi denotes the number of votes for any candidate i and Vd is the number of valid votes in
district d.
Table 2. Median votes by gender and incumbency.
Election year 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
Women 314 70 43 186 100 220
Men 290 102 71 206 196 238
Women’s vote as % of men’s
All 108.5 68.6 61.3 90.3 51.3 92.7
Not incumbents 111.1 71.3 66.4 99.4 50.0 93.1
Incumbents 95.8 114.1 133.6 98.0 139.7 86.6
Notes: The median number of votes for both genders is affected by the number of candidates running for ofﬁce. In 1995
and 1999, the number of candidates was very large and subsequently the median vote is low.
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The results in Table 3 are consistent with the analysis of votes presented previously. Accord-
ing to the models, female candidates received fewer votes in ﬁve of the six elections, but the coef-
ﬁcient is large and signiﬁcant only in three – in1995, 1999, and 2007. These were the elections
where we also saw a surge in the number of female candidates. In 2003 and 2011, the coefﬁcient
for “Female” is small and the effect falls well below signiﬁcance. As already indicated by the
medians, women are, all else being equal, associated with a greater vote share during the ﬁrst elec-
tions in 1992. This is surprising in light of the negative public attitudes towards female leadership
in the early 1990s, but not implausible. It is likely that in 1992 many potential female candidates
did not even consider running for ofﬁce. Or as Fox and Lawless (2004, 2011) put it, many women
“weed themselves out” by never entering the arena. The women that did run were exceptionally
strong candidates.
The transformation of the dependent variable makes the coefﬁcients difﬁcult to interpret from
the table. For this reason, the effect of gender is shown in Figure 1 for the 1999 election. The
ﬁgure shows the predicted vote shares and 95% conﬁdence intervals for incumbent and non-
incumbent candidates of both genders by the popularity of the party. All predictions are for a can-
didate who is of average age, placed 20th on the national list and 3rd on the district list.
Figure 1 shows that the effect of gender on votes is statistically signiﬁcant for those candidates
who are not incumbents, but not signiﬁcant for incumbents. When the party’s popularity in the
district reaches 20%, the predicted vote share for a male incumbent is 3.8% and 3.1% for a
female incumbent. While the difference is noticeable (about 275 votes in an average district),
the conﬁdence intervals overlap and include the mean of the other group. For candidates who
have not held a national ofﬁce, men receive about 0.2% more votes than women. While the
gap is small, the conﬁdence intervals do not always overlap and the difference is statistically sig-
niﬁcant. The comparison of gender differences in votes for the two groups of candidates tells us
Table 3. Explaining vote shares, 1992–2011.
DV: logit
(% district votes) 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
Intercept −5.162***
(0.595)
−7.177***
(0.441)
−7.569***
(0.302)
−7.276***
(0.389)
−6.798***
(0.434)
−5.829***
(0.435)
Female 0.250**
(0.120)
−0.189**
(0.085)
−0.218***
(0.056)
−0.102
(0.071)
−0.203***
(0.073)
−0.057
(0.080)
National list place 0.001
(0.002)
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.003***
(0.001)
−0.006***
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.005***
(0.001)
District list place −0.288***
(0.024)
−0.199***
(0.014)
−0.088***
(0.005)
−0.153***
(0.013)
−0.187***
(0.012)
−0.183***
(0.014)
Incumbent 0.862***
(0.162)
1.060***
(0.133)
1.509***
(0.127)
0.649***
(0.104)
0.842***
(0.119)
0.768***
(0.112)
Age 0.019
(0.025)
0.056***
(0.019)
0.052***
(0.013)
0.082***
(0.017)
0.058***
(0.019)
0.023
(0.019)
Age2 −0.000
(0.000)
−0.001***
(0.000)
−0.001***
(0.000)
−0.001***
(0.000)
−0.001***
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
Party district votes 5.745***
(0.533)
7.871***
(0.323)
8.816***
(0.318)
9.228***
(0.293)
8.360***
(0.316)
7.544***
(0.315)
N 629 1251 1884 963 975 789
R2 0.412 0.470 0.499 0.617 0.589 0.616
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
***p ,.01.
**p ,.05.
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that the statistically signiﬁcant effect of gender in Table 3 is driven by a large group of non-incum-
bent candidates, among whom women do much worse than men.
To provide further support for this, the same regression model was repeated after splitting the
candidates of the 1999 election into two groups based on incumbency. The coefﬁcient for
“Female” for the non-incumbents was large (−0.227) and highly signiﬁcant, but for incumbents
it was small, insigniﬁcant, and positive (0.071). Furthermore, the absence of a gender gap can also
be attributed to a broader popularity or visibility of the candidate rather than just incumbency. For
example, the candidates of the 1999 election were split into two groups based on votes – those
who received minimum 10% of the quota (eligible for a district mandate according to the law)
and those who received under 10% of the quota (not eligible for a district mandate). The ﬁrst
group included most of the incumbents but also a number of other strong candidates (business,
local or other notables). The coefﬁcient for “Female” was again small (−0.011) and insigniﬁcant
among these strong candidates, but large (−0.199) and signiﬁcant among the weak candidates
(results shown in the Appendix Tables A2 and A3). In other words, gender had an effect on
votes only among the weak candidates, but not when the candidate is otherwise familiar to voters.
From these results, we can conclude that gender does not have a consistent effect on votes.
Rather, the analysis of votes tells us that the statistically signiﬁcant effect of gender is driven
by a large group of weak candidates among whom women do much worse than men. But the stat-
istically signiﬁcant difference in votes among the weakest candidates is not substantively signiﬁ-
cant in terms of the election outcomes. These weak candidates, regardless of gender, have little
chance of being elected.
These ﬁndings have two important implications. First, it may mean that women have a more
difﬁcult time entering the arena than men – when candidates are new or relatively unknown to
voters, the preference is for the male candidate. This would explain why women receive fewer
votes among the non-incumbent candidates. At the same time, once a candidate has reached a
certain level of visibility, such as incumbency, voters do not seem to care about gender. This
explains the lack of a gender gap among incumbents. Second, if gender differences in votes only
exist among the less visible and less popular candidates, it will not necessarily translate into an
effect of gender on election chances. A gender gap in the probability of getting elected would
require a gender vote gap among the competitive candidates. In fact, the percent of women in
the parliament actually increased during the 1999 and 2007 elections, suggesting again that the
gender vote gap applied in a limited manner, not to all women, but to the weaker and less visible.
Figure 1. Predicted vote shares by gender and incumbency, 1999.
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Multilevel models with the same variables were also tested, which added party random
effects to capture other party-level variation not explicitly measured (results shown in the
Appendix Table A1). While there is some change in the coefﬁcients, particularly for party dis-
trict votes, the main conclusions from the multilevel models are the same as from the OLS
regression. Interaction terms between party effects and gender (random slopes on
“Female”) were also included, but none of the party-speciﬁc slopes were statistically signiﬁ-
cant, nor added anything to the model’s explanatory power. This is partially due to the small
number of female candidates per party – it is difﬁcult to estimate an effect with just 10–20
observations.
The other control variables in the model had their expected effects. Ranking lower on the dis-
trict and national lists is associated with fewer votes. The sizes of coefﬁcients vary across elec-
tions, but are roughly of the same magnitude. Making conclusive statements about the
causality of the effect between placement and vote shares is somewhat difﬁcult. Parties can
and often do place popular candidates at the top of the list, and popularity thus inﬂuences list pos-
ition. On the other hand, voters take cues from list placement and are more likely to support higher
ranked candidates. There is likely a two-way causality by which higher ranked candidates receive
more votes and are in return placed high on the list.
Also as expected, incumbency increases a candidate’s votes in all six elections. There is some
variation in the size of the coefﬁcient, with the effect being smallest in 2003, when the elections
resulted in an exceptionally high turnover. To capture party effects, the model uses the share of
party votes in the district of the candidate. Table 3 shows that the party’s popularity in a district
is strongly associated with candidate’s votes, and the size of the effect changes little over the
years. The effect of age on votes is inverse U-shaped as shown by the coefﬁcient on the
squared term. Initially, an increase in age increases votes, but the effect plateaus at 55 and then
reverses. The size of the effect is fairly constant across elections, but not signiﬁcant in 1992
and 2011. Overall, district list position, incumbency, and popularity of the party in the district
are the most consistent predictors of candidate’s votes.
The model ﬁt is reasonably good for the years 2003–2011, but weaker for the ﬁrst three elec-
tions, where the covariates explain only about a half of the variation in vote shares. This change in
model ﬁt can be explained by the consolidation of the party system and democracy, which have
made elections more predictable through the conventional variables. Major parties and popular
candidates have emerged and people have a clearer idea of what each of them represents. This
is especially so as much of the explanatory power can be attributed to the popularity of the can-
didate’s party.
5. Gender and getting elected
We now turn to testing the hypothesis that, compared to men, women are disadvantaged in getting
a seat though open lists. While Section 4 found the female candidates sometimes receive fewer
votes, it was emphasised that this may not have a consequence for women’s election chances.
If the statistically signiﬁcant gender vote gap is driven by a large group of candidates who
have little or no chance of election, we might ﬁnd that gender has no impact on election
probability.
Table 4 shows the results of a standard logistic regression where the dependent variable is
coded one if a candidate is elected from the district (that is through open lists) and zero otherwise.
District size is accounted for by including it as an explanatory variable. Using an interaction
between gender and district magnitude, we can test whether women have a higher chance of elec-
tion in larger districts compared to smaller districts. Other controls are the same as in the previous
section.6
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The results show, with two signiﬁcant exceptions, that gender has a fairly marginal effect on
election from open lists. Women are, according to the models, associated with better chances of
election from the districts in 1992, 1995, and 2011, but the effect is far from signiﬁcant. In 1999,
the effect is negative, but small and not signiﬁcant. Though we previously found that female can-
didates received fewer votes in 1995 and 1999, this has not affected their chances of election. The
results are expected as the difference in votes was driven by candidates who had little chance of
election. While the dependent variable “votes” distinguishes between candidates who receive 5,
50, or 500 votes, it makes little difference for the variable “elected from open lists” – none of these
candidates have a realistic chance of winning a district seat.
However, female candidates are disadvantaged in getting elected in 2003 and 2007, with the
effect being especially large and signiﬁcant in 2003. The effect is smaller and just below conven-
tional signiﬁcance levels in 2007. Why do we ﬁnd such a strong effect of gender in 2003? The
question is particularly interesting as we found no effect of gender on votes that year.
The answer lies in party turnover. The party that gained most seats in 2003 was Res Publica, a
party with fewer women among candidates than other parties. Res Publica had no women at the
top of the district lists and only 17% of top three candidates in districts were women. Other par-
liamentary parties had some female candidates placed at the top of the list and most also had more
women among the top three. Res Publica was also a new party that had no incumbents among
their ranks. As we saw previously, without the advantages of incumbency or other means of visi-
bility, women are disadvantaged at the polls compared to men. Thus, the popularity of a party with
Table 4. Getting elected from districts (open lists), 1992–2011.
DV: Elected (=1) 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
Intercept −10.354***
(3.885)
−5.640
(4.237)
−7.834**
(3.939)
−4.566
(3.299)
1.520
(2.926)
−5.107
(3.365)
Female 1.951
(2.549)
1.427
(5.839)
−0.471
(2.423)
−7.111**
(2.855)
−3.083
(1.883)
0.852
(1.577)
Female*DM −0.226
(0.300)
−0.182
(0.641)
0.044
(0.246)
0.741**
(0.317)
0.368*
(0.204)
−0.086
(0.168)
National list
place
−0.002
(0.012)
−0.027**
(0.012)
−0.015**
(0.006)
−0.016*
(0.009)
−0.023***
(0.008)
0.007
(0.010)
District list place −0.805***
(0.202)
−0.777***
(0.170)
−0.690***
(0.126)
−1.069***
(0.168)
−0.891***
(0.150)
−1.486***
(0.222)
Incumbent 1.162**
(0.505)
1.514***
(0.499)
1.231***
(0.414)
−0.127
(0.420)
1.456***
(0.394)
1.004**
(0.407)
Age 0.118
(0.157)
−0.080
(0.156)
0.077
(0.155)
0.018
(0.129)
−0.181
(0.123)
0.081
(0.145)
Age2 −0.001
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.002)
−0.000
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.002)
DM 0.344***
(0.105)
0.307*
(0.182)
0.251**
(0.107)
0.216*
(0.128)
0.153
(0.113)
0.275***
(0.096)
Party district
votes
22.974***
(3.062)
19.655***
(2.301)
21.782***
(2.698)
20.237***
(2.146)
16.392***
(2.004)
18.667***
(2.357)
N 629 1251 1884 963 975 789
% correct (all) 95.23 97.68 98.09 94.91 95.49 95.31
% correct (y=1) 41.46 57.14 50.91 55.41 61.33 68.29
AIC 176.20 178.18 232.12 249.47 234.92 222.13
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
***p ,.01.
**p ,.05.
*p , 0.1.
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no incumbents and few top-ranking women has, in this case, had an adverse effect on women’s
election to ofﬁce.
The lack of women among the ﬁrst few candidates is also why the effect of gender is conﬁned
mostly to small districts, where party magnitudes are very small and placing ﬁrst is often the only
result that matters. We see this by looking at the interaction term between gender and district mag-
nitudes, which is large and signiﬁcant for 2003. While women are disadvantaged in getting
elected (negative coefﬁcient for “Female”), this ceases to be the case as district size grows (posi-
tive coefﬁcient for the interaction term).
Figure 2 nicely illustrates this effect by showing the predicted probability of election for a
male and female candidate by district size. Both candidates are placed 2nd in the district, 30th
nationally, with other variables kept at the means and medians. While the second ranked men
have some chance of election (approximately 20%) in districts with ﬁve to seven seats, women
in these districts have almost no chance at all (probability below 5%). Also notice that the
95% conﬁdence intervals do not overlap in these districts, and the effect of gender on election
probability is signiﬁcant. The effect disappears and even reverses in average sized (8–9 seats)
and in larger districts, but the election gap beneﬁting women is not signiﬁcant.
To see what effect Res Publica has on the 2003 results, the above model was rerun excluding
the party from the data. This reduced the size of the coefﬁcient for “Female” and for the inter-
action term, and increased both standard errors. As a result, neither coefﬁcient was statistically
signiﬁcant. The same model on only Res Publica candidates produced a very large and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for gender.
Because of the sudden success of Res Publica, one might ask if other parties responded to this
by altering their candidate lists accordingly, for example, bringing in new non-incumbent faces or
reducing the number of women among candidates. There is no evidence that these calculations
affected the decisions of other parties with respect to candidate selection. In fact, the number
of female candidates rose in 2007. The reason why Res Publica did not have a lasting effect
on Estonian politics is probably that its immense success was followed by just as an impressive
decline in popularity. Before the election of 2007, polls showed the support for Res Publica to be
below the 5% electoral threshold, and the party merged with the Pro Patria Union to avoid losing
all of its seats.
The results of 2003 are also noteworthy, because in this case high legislative turnover
hindered women’s representation – the party that gained most from turnover nominated few
Figure 2. Predicted probability of election by gender and district size, 2003.
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female candidates. This result is contrary to previous work that mostly concludes that high leg-
islative turnover increases women’s representation (Matland 1993; Darcy, Welch, and Clark
1994; Schwindt-Bayer 2005). It has been argued that since incumbency has a very strong positive
effect on re-election and most incumbents are male, lower turnover will disadvantage women and
perpetuate the gender gap. But we can clearly see from the 2003 example that the effect of turn-
over is conditional on party preferences about female candidates. Gains made by a (right-wing)
party with few female candidates do not increase women’s representation.
Of the other controls, placement in national and district lists, party support in a district, and
incumbency have a consistent and a signiﬁcant effect on candidate’s election chances, just as they
did on votes. Incumbency generally increases a candidate’s election probability, except in 2003,
when it had a much smaller effect because of the large turnover caused by the very successful
entry of the new party Res Publica. Their success has largely been attributed to the lack of incum-
bents among the candidates and the party’s newness (e.g. see Taagepera 2006; Sikk 2011).
While a candidate’s age had an effect on votes from 1995 to 2007, the logit regressions in
Table 4 show that this did not translate into an effect on the success of getting elected. The
table also shows that an increase in district magnitude increases the probability of election
from open lists for all candidates. This occurs because larger districts are generally less competi-
tive in terms of the candidates per mandate ratio. The size of the effect ﬂuctuates over years, but is
generally of the same degree. Most of the models can correctly predict the election of more than
half of those who indeed were elected. Predictions are the least accurate in 1992, which can be due
to the generally higher uncertainties surrounding early democratic elections.
6. Gender and placement in national list
Thus far, we have looked at potential voter bias against female candidates. While gender was
related to votes and being elected on some occasions, it did not have a consistent effect on a can-
didate’s votes or election chances from open lists. In other words, we did not ﬁnd conclusive evi-
dence of voter bias. This section explores the possibility of party bias against female candidates by
looking at the effect of gender on election from closed national lists. Top placement on the closed
national list can be seen as a means to guarantee the election of candidates the party considers
important, but who might not be popular among voters. As such, observing the relationship
between gender and national list position is the best way to gauge party bias.
Table 5 presents an overview of the relationship between gender and placement in national
lists. The ﬁrst two columns for each year show the number of men and women at each placement
group, and the third column shows the ratio of men to women. Highlighted cells show cases
where men are disproportionally over-represented compared to the overall ratio of men to
women. A pattern emerges across all elections – men are over-represented among the top 20–
30 positions and also among the bottom 20–30 positions. Women are disproportionally placed
in the middle, sometimes in places 20–30, but most often at places 30–40 and beyond. Given
the small size of the Riigikogu (101 members) and the multiparty system, a place below the
30th rarely matters – few parties ever take over 30 seats, and candidates placed lower than 30
have a very small probability of election through national lists. Thus, women are less likely to
be placed in electable positions on the closed list than men.
The table also shows the number of men and women in mandate, challenge, and ornamental
positions – positions from which election is almost guaranteed, from which it is likely if the party
does well, and from which it is impossible respectively (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985).
Similar to the work of Jones (2004), mandate positions are deﬁned for each party as those
from which candidates were elected to ofﬁce from that party at two consecutive elections (i.e.
the current and the previous elections).7 Challenge positions are those where candidates were
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Table 5. Ratio of men and women in national lists, 1992–2011.
Placement
1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
M F Ratio M F Ratio M F Ratio M F Ratio M F Ratio M F Ratio
Mandate 23 6 3.8 45 11 4.1 52 14 3.7 49 17 2.9 66 20 3.3
Challenge 103 12 8.6 67 15 4.5 53 10 5.3 33 8 4.1 22 8 2.8
Ornamental 901 199 4.5 1248 479 2.6 638 180 3.5 624 237 2.6 496 145 3.4
1–10 131 18 7.3 140 20 7.0 100 21 4.8 88 22 4.0 82 28 2.9 74 16 4.6
11–20 90 16 5.6 134 24 5.6 98 22 4.5 75 19 3.9 69 23 3.0 62 15 4.1
21–30 64 11 5.8 117 29 4.0 89 31 2.9 76 14 5.4 62 28 2.2 41 19 2.2
31–40 42 8 5.2 105 16 6.6 81 35 2.3 65 12 5.4 59 26 2.3 44 16 2.8
41–50 42 7 6.0 95 25 3.8 79 30 2.6 52 18 2.9 58 22 2.6 50 10 5.0
51–60 35 5 7.0 83 20 4.2 85 25 3.4 50 20 2.5 51 22 2.3 47 13 3.6
61–70 35 5 7.0 77 20 3.8 67 25 2.7 57 13 4.4 53 17 3.1 45 15 3.0
71–80 25 8 3.1 65 18 3.6 54 26 2.1 50 20 2.5 49 21 2.3 46 14 3.3
81–90 24 6 4.0 56 24 2.3 58 22 2.6 51 19 2.7 50 20 2.5 44 14 3.1
91–100 24 3 8.0 73 7 10.4 59 21 2.8 51 19 2.7 49 21 2.3 40 10 4.0
101–110 4 0 Inf 33 8 4.1 53 27 2.0 54 12 4.5 55 13 4.2 39 11 3.5
111–120 12 2 6.0 52 28 1.9 49 11 4.5 48 12 4.0 36 14 2.6
121–130 8 2 4.0 54 26 2.1 25 5 5.0 21 9 2.3 16 6 2.7
130+ 29 2 14.5 431 166 2.6
Total 516 87 5.9 1027 217 4.7 1360 505 2.7 743 204 3.6 706 262 2.7 584 173 3.4
Note: Highlighted cells refer to cases where the number of men was disproportionally high compared to the overall ratio of men in that election year.
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elected from at one election, but not at another election. Ornamental positions were deﬁned as
those from which candidates were not elected in either election. Since many parties in Estonia
often win seats in only one or two elections, there are a lot of challenge positions, especially
in 1995 and 1999. Overall, the picture is similar to what saw with placements – women are
more likely to be placed in unelectable ornamental positions than in electable mandate or
challenge positions. The proportion of women in mandate positions is quite high in some cases
(e.g. 1995 and 2003), but as the proportion of mandate positions themselves is often quite low,
it does not have a very strong effect on the overall representation of women. We can also
notice that women’s placement in the closed lists over the six elections has improved, and that
the proportion of men and women at different positions has become more similar.
Of course, placement can also be inﬂuenced by other candidate characteristics, particularly
incumbency, and this should be taken into account. Designing a multivariate test for list place-
ment poses, however, some challenges. One option would be to use OLS, with placement as
the dependent variable. But here we should be reminded that the relationship between gender
and placement in Table 5 is not linear across the whole list. A linear relationship can mostly
be noted among the top 40 or 60 positions. An option would thus be to drop all cases beyond
some reasonable cut-off point (e.g. 30, 40, or 60) from the data set and run the analysis on the
smaller subset. In general, this may prove a fruitful strategy, but problems arise when the cut-
off point is poorly deﬁned. Consider, for example, the placements in 2003 in Table 5. Women
are underrepresented among the ﬁrst 40, but the underrepresentation is higher among positions
21–40 than among places 1–20. Thus, only analysing positions up to 40 without any reference
to places 41–60 or beyond we would make the wrong conclusion about the relationship
between gender and placement. A reasonable cut-off point – one that provides sufﬁcient reference
to the overall male–female ratio of candidates – depends on the election in question.
Some authors have used a binary dependent variable such as “ﬁrst position” or “top position”
to analyse the relationship between gender and list placement (e.g. Kunovich 2003). Few pos-
itions, such as the ﬁrst three or ﬁve, are deﬁned as the “top positions” and the rest as not. This
method takes account of all places, thus avoiding the problem of no or incomplete reference to
the lower places, but the ﬂip side is losing information in the dependent variable (it is now binary).
Because of the different shortcomings of the two approaches, this article uses both methods
with various cut-off points and deﬁnitions of “top position”. Results for the variable “Female” are
shown in Figure 3. All models also controlled for other individual-level predictors of national list
placement such as age (including a squared term) and incumbency.
The OLS models with cut-off points set at 30, 35, 40, 60, and 90 show that female candidates
were always positively related to the position on the national list, meaning that women placed lower
after controlling for age and incumbency. The size and the 95% conﬁdence intervals for the coefﬁ-
cient for “Female” are shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 3. The statistical signiﬁcance of the
effect depends on the year and the cut-off point. Women were associated with lower positions more
frequently in 1995, 1999, and 2011, placing, ceteris paribus, two to ﬁve positions lower than men.
In 2003, the effect becomes statistically signiﬁcant when the cut-off is increased to the 90th place.
Gender had no statistically signiﬁcant effect on national list placement in 1992 and 2007.
For the logit models, the binary variable “top position” was deﬁned as placing ﬁrst, or among
the 3, 5, 10, or 15 top-ranked candidates. The size and the 95% conﬁdence intervals of the coefﬁ-
cient for “Female” are shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 3. Female candidates were always
negatively related to obtaining a top position. The effect of gender was strongest for the elections
of 1995, 1999, and 2003 when the effect was signiﬁcant for two deﬁnitions of the top position. An
effect is also visible in 2011, when women were less likely to obtain a place among the ﬁrst 15. In
2007, the coefﬁcient for gender was signiﬁcant at p ,.1 level, and gender had no effect on place-
ment in 1992.
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These two types of regression models on the effect of gender on list placement conform to
what was presented in Table 5; parties do not place female candidates at the top of the closed
national lists. While it has been argued that women can beneﬁt from closed lists because
parties place them at electable positions, these data show no evidence of this. In fact, the
results are quite the opposite. The negative effect of being a woman on receiving a top ranking
is evidence that parties are, to an extent, biased against female candidates, and hinder women’s
chances of election from the closed lists. This is particularly true for the elections of 1995,
1999, 2003, and also 2011. However, the effect was not completely consistent and in 1992 and
2007, the effect of gender on placement was smaller and not signiﬁcant.
The effect gender has on placement may also vary across parties. For example, parties on the ideo-
logical left are associated with more women among party executives, candidates, and elected ofﬁcials
in Estonia. Between 1998 and 2011, the percentage of female party executives has been about 30% in
the left-leaning Estonian Social Democrats (SDE) and the Centre Party. In the right-leaning Reform
Party and the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL), women only comprise 12–16% of the execu-
tives during the same period. Also, while the percent of women executives has, to an extent, increased
in SDE and Center Party, it has remained constant in the Reform Party and IRL.
To test for differences in women’s placement between left and right parties’models with inter-
actions between party ideology and candidate gender were ran for 2003–2011.8 Two different
codings for left and right were used. Ideology was coded only for the four major parties in the
ﬁrst case, and all seven parliamentary parties of the period were coded in the second case. The
OLS models on list place with various cut-off points showed that, regardless of the coding,
Figure 3. The effect of “Female” on national list placement, 1992–2011.
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women were usually associated with better positions in the left parties compared to those of the
right. The results for the logistic regressions on “top positions” were very similar – women were
more often associated with these positions in left parties rather than in right parties. For both types
of models, the differences between parties were most noticeable for 2007. However, most coefﬁ-
cients for the interactions were not signiﬁcant at the conventional levels. This is not very surpris-
ing as the number of women among this subgroup of candidates is small and the estimation
becomes difﬁcult when we further split female candidates by party ideology. Thus, the results
on the effect of ideology should be taken with great caution.
Overall, these results tell us that without any quotas or placement mandates parties did
not improve women’s election chances by placing them further up in the closed list. On the con-
trary, parties were more likely use these lists to guarantee the election of male candidates. But
there are again some exceptions – in 1992 and 2007 gender did not have an effect on closed
list placement.
7. Conclusions
The debate on the beneﬁts and drawbacks of closed and open lists on women’s representation is
often seen as a choice between electoral systems. Researchers have compared the level of
women’s representation in countries with different levels of personal vote incentives and some-
times conclude that women have better chances of election in countries with closed lists compared
to open lists. This article has argued that we can also look at this debate from the perspective of
who stands in the way of women to elected ofﬁce – whether it is parties who do not endorse
women’s candidacy or voters who do not vote for them. Looking at the problem this way
allows us to test the causal mechanism that links list types to representation more closely. The
article used data from six Estonian parliamentary elections from 1992 to 2011. The Estonian
case is useful here as the country uses both open and closed lists, allowing us to simultaneously
test both party and voter biases. This makes the work quite unique as most of previous research
has either focused on the relationship between voters and candidates or parties and candidates.
The ﬁrst democratic elections resulted in very few female representatives, particularly from
the open lists. This caused speculation that voters are biased against female candidates.
However, the multivariate models presented here show little evidence of a consistent voter
bias. While female candidates were sometimes associated with fewer votes, the effect was statisti-
cally signiﬁcant in only three of the six elections. More importantly, a detailed analysis showed
that the effect of gender on votes was driven by a large group of weak candidates, those who had
no chance of elections. The relationship between gender and votes ceases to be signiﬁcant among
incumbents and other visible candidates. In other words, if the candidate is relatively well known,
gender has no impact on the decisions of voters.
The article then looked at the probability of election and found even less evidence of any gender
difference. While gender sometimes has an effect on votes, this did not translate into an effect on the
probability of being elected – women did not have a signiﬁcantly lower chance of election. This is
an interesting ﬁnding, and occurs because the relationship between gender and votes was driven by
a large group of weak candidates who had no realistic chance of election. An exception was the
election of 2003, when female candidates had a signiﬁcantly lower election probability from
open lists compared to men. This occurred due to the successful entry of a new party, Res
Publica, which had no women among the ﬁrst ranked positions and fewer women than other
parties among the top three in district lists. This played an especially big role in smaller districts,
where even the successful parties usually only win one seat. In such districts, even those female
candidates who ranked second or third after the votes were tallied were unable to win a seat. In
average sized and larger districts gender had no impact on election.
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On a positive note, the above results on the effect of gender on votes and election chances in
open lists tells us that, when candidates have achieved a certain level of recognition, gender has no
signiﬁcant impact on the decisions of voters. An incumbent or otherwise visible female candidate
is just as likely as a man to receive a lot of votes and win an open list seat. From this perspective,
the poor representation of women from open list seats at the ﬁrst elections was not due to a con-
sistent voter bias, but rather a consequence of few electable female candidates and small party
magnitudes. On the negative side, we still ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant gender vote gap
among the large group of weak and unknown candidates. This may mean that when a candidate
is new to the public, voter preference is more likely to be for the male contender, making it more
difﬁcult for an unknown female candidate to enter politics.
Candidates’ visibility and electability can be signiﬁcantly improved by the parties, either by
campaign or by list placement. The Estonian electoral system allows parties to rank order candi-
dates in the national and in the district lists. Particularly important for a new candidate can be the
placement in the closed national party list, where a high ranking can guarantee election. Previous
research has argued that closed lists are beneﬁcial for women’s election for exactly this reason –
parties can get female candidates elected by placing them at the top of the closed lists.
The evidence presented in this article shows that parties are anything but supportive of female
candidates. Women are associated with lower places on closed lists, even when controlling for
incumbency and age. Women generally occupy middle positions on the lists, and men are
more often placed at the top and the bottom of lists. Candidates placed in the middle or in the
second half of the list have little chance of getting elected from the closed list. Given this, it is
hard to argue that closed lists necessarily improve women’s representation. Much depends on
parties’ willingness to support female candidates, and at least in Estonia, this willingness has
in general been lacking.
In conclusion, it appears that entering the political arena is still the major obstacle for women,
particularly for those who do not belong to any social, economic, or political elite. Unknown
female candidates are likely to fare worse than men at the polls. While the parties could have a
major impact on the visibility of unknown female candidates by placing them further up on
the closed lists, they do not help women along. In fact, they even disadvantage women further
by placing them further down on national lists.
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Notes
1. Estonia uses the simple quota, i.e., Hare quota.
2. This is unlike preference voting systems (e.g., Sweden), where voters can choose whether to give a vote
to a party or to a candidate.
3. According to the World Values Survey and the Eurobarometer, these trends are similar to public attitudes
in other Eastern European countries, such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. In 1995, over 60% of respon-
dents in the three countries agreed that men make better leaders, but this had dropped to 40–47% by 2005.
In contrast, this percentage has consistently been below 20% in Scandinavian countries.
4. Incumbents include members of the parliament, cabinet ministers, and MEPs (from 2007). For the elec-
tion of 1992, the members of the Supreme Council of Estonia (elected in 1990 in the ﬁrst multi-party
elections in decades) are considered as incumbents.
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5. The use of this transformation is problematic when a candidate receives no votes (the log becomes
minus inﬁnity). To avoid the problem, candidates with no votes are assigned one vote. Over the six elec-
tions, there are only ﬁve such candidates, one in1992 and four in 1999.
6. It was not possible to estimate multilevel models in this case as the number of candidates elected per
party (particularly female candidates) is so small.
7. Results could not be provided for 1992 as the elections preceding this used a different electoral system.
8. The ﬁrst three elections were excluded here as it is difﬁcult to deﬁne ideology for many parties contest-
ing elections and winning seats in the 1990s.
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Appendix
Table A1. Explaining vote shares, 1992–2011 (multilevel models).
DV: logit
(% district votes) 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
Fixed part
Intercept −5.037***
(0.590)
−6.347***
(0.452)
−7.227***
(0.325)
−6.730***
(0.408)
−5.587***
(0.468)
−5.154***
(0.439)
Female 0.164*
(0.117)
−0.199***
(0.076)
−0.145***
(0.051)
−0.042
(0.063)
−0.129**
(0.060)
−0.100
(0.073)
National list place −0.003*
(0.002)
−0.004***
(0.001)
−0.005***
(0.001)
−0.009***
(0.001)
−0.008***
(0.001)
−0.008***
(0.001)
District list place −0.278***
(0.023)
−0.222***
(0.013)
−0.083***
(0.005)
−0.159***
(0.012)
−0.189***
(0.011)
−0.175***
(0.014)
Incumbent 0.789***
(0.158)
0.815***
(0.123)
1.419***
(0.118)
0.442***
(0.096)
0.511***
(0.100)
0.678***
(0.103)
Age 0.012
(0.025)
0.027*
(0.017)
0.050***
(0.012)
0.069***
(0.015)
0.019
(0.016)
0.009
(0.017)
Age2 0.000
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
−0.001***
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
District party votes 4.636***
(0.662)
5.114***
(0.726)
5.933***
(0.798)
5.244***
(0.614)
4.568***
(0.822)
4.127***
(0.621)
Random part/variances
Candidate level 0.964
(0.055)
0.947
(0.040)
0.908
(0.031)
0.586
(0.028)
0.627
(0.030)
0.686
(0.037)
Party level 0.220
(0.092)
0.604
(0.216)
0.297
(0.124)
0.552
(0.233)
1.021
(0.426)
0.383
(0.182)
District party level 0.000
(0.000)
0.074
(0.024)
0.101
(0.023)
0.049
(0.017)
0.120
(0.028)
0.064
(0.023)
ICC 18.6 37.2 22.7 46.5 57.7 34.0
−2 LogLik 1795 3611 5317 2321 2464 2025
N candidates 629 1251 1884 963 975 789
N parties 18 17 13 12 12 10
N district parties 1720 183 142 143 135 119
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
***p ,.01.
**p ,.05.
*p ,.1.
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Table A2. Explaining vote shares, 1992–2011 (weak candidates).
DV: logit
(% district votes) 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
Intercept −5.549***
(0.532)
−7.564***
(0.392)
−7.617***
(0.28)
−7.623***
(0.385)
−7.201***
(0.399)
−6.251***
(0.402)
Female 0.195*
(0.116)
−0.129*
(0.076)
−0.199***
(0.052)
−0.092
(0.074)
−0.209***
(0.070)
−0.044
(0.079)
National list place 0.007***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
−0.002***
(0.000)
−0.004***
(0.001)
0.002**
(0.001)
−0.002
(0.001)
District list place −0.173***
(0.023)
−0.130***
(0.013)
−0.066***
(0.005)
−0.090***
(0.014)
−0.129***
(0.012)
−0.141***
(0.013)
Incumbent 0.179
(0.270)
0.339*
(0.174)
1.000***
(0.191)
0.364**
(0.160)
0.290
(0.199)
0.116
(0.194)
Age 0.014
(0.023)
0.055***
(0.017)
0.041***
(0.012)
0.076***
(0.017)
0.042**
(0.017)
0.017
(0.017)
Age2 0.000
(0.000)
−0.001***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
−0.001***
(0.000)
0.000**
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Party district votes 1.718***
(0.542)
5.312***
(0.361)
7.040***
(0.315)
7.374***
(0.378)
6.948***
(0.349)
6.472***
(0.345)
N 406 1062 1685 716 752 571
R2 0.171 0.236 0.333 0.394 0.419 0.428
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
***p ,.01.
**p ,.05.
*p ,.1.
Table A3. Explaining vote shares, 1992–2011 (strong candidates).
DV: logit
(% district votes) 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
Intercept −5.014***
(0.684)
−4.808***
(1.075)
−4.619***
(0.798)
−4.674***
(0.643)
−4.722***
(0.701)
−3.462***
(0.716)
Female 0.033
(0.118)
−0.258
(0.174)
−0.011
(0.124)
−0.045
(0.094)
−0.045
(0.096)
−0.173*
(0.102)
National list place −0.001
(0.002)
−0.002
(0.002)
−0.002**
(0.001)
−0.003*
(0.002)
−0.004***
(0.001)
−0.003
(0.002)
District list place −0.260***
(0.029)
−0.147***
(0.023)
−0.092***
(0.016)
−0.146***
(0.020)
−0.132***
(0.017)
−0.131***
(0.025)
Incumbent 0.267**
(0.113)
0.314***
(0.119)
0.378***
(0.113)
0.120
(0.091)
0.223**
(0.091)
0.278***
(0.095)
Age 0.046
(0.029)
0.043
(0.044)
0.026
(0.032)
0.046
(0.028)
0.067**
(0.03)
0.002
(0.031)
Age2 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0 .000
(0.000)
−0.001*
(0.000)
−0.001***
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Party district votes 5.858***
(0.538)
3.602***
(0.442)
4.014***
(0.651)
3.515***
(0.438)
2.897***
(0.395)
2.456***
(0.424)
N 223 189 199 247 223 218
R2 0.485 0.379 0.350 0.383 0.430 0.429
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
***p ,.01.
**p ,.05.
*p ,.1.
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